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INTRODUCTION

The joint venture is a form of organization widely used in international business. Although anticompetitive effects of mergers,
interlocking directorates, and cartels are more frequently the targets of enforcement efforts under antitrust laws than joint ventures, the latter can be equally effective in reducing competition
in the market place.
The legal status of joint ventures in various jurisdictions has
remained a subject of some confusion possibly because of their
hybrid nature-not quite cartels, yet not quite mergers. This confusion still exists to some extent in the United States, despite the
fact that the Supreme Court has held that section 7 of the Clayton
Act, which is aimed specifically at mergers, is also applicable to
joint ventures. Although it is not the purpose of this article to
discuss antitrust policy toward joint ventures in the United States,
the subject matter is important to American business firms, particularly those contemplating joint ventures with Common Market
partners. When firms "domiciled" in different jurisdictions undertake joint operations, the antitrust inquiry may involve more than
one set of antitrust laws, and it is quite likely that a restraint on
competition which is legal in one forum may be illegal under the
laws of another. This is especially true when the analysis involves
United States and Common Market antitrust rules, primarily because the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) has no provision comparable to section 7 of
the Clayton Act prohibiting anticompetitive effects resulting from
mergers. Another major reason is the fact that the EEC Treaty
contains a provision which provides an exemption for prohibited
anticompetitive agreements meeting certain criteria. No such exemption is found in United States law.
The status of joint ventures in the Common Market has only
recently become a subject of legal commentary, primarily because
no cases involving joint ventures under the EEC Treaty's competition rules have been decided by the European Court of Justice. The
principal source of Common Market antitrust policy toward this
business form has consequently been the Commission of the European Communities-the so-called executive arm of the Community. Although the Commission has been somewhat slow in
elaborating its position on this subject, it has now rendered several
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decisions which shed some light on its attitude toward joint ventures and has clarified its approach to some extent in several of its
annual Reports on Competition Policy.
II.

CHARACTERISTICS OF JOINT

VENTURES

In the broadest sense, the term "joint venture" 1 may be applied
to every situation where two or more persons or firms cooperate to
achieve a common goal. 2 Because that definition is clearly too
broad to describe accurately many situations upon which this article will focus, a much more practical definition is that set forth in
the Commission's Fourth Report on Competition Policy: "A joint
venture is generally defined as an enterprise subject to joint control
by two or more undertakings which are economically independent
of each other."' 3 This definition is not entirely accurate, however,
for in some instances formation of the joint venture may result in
a concentration not only betwen each parent and the jointly-owned
enterprise, but also between the parents themselves. The parents
may then be said to have lost their economic independence.
Although it is not essential, the jointly-owned enterprise will
usually possess its own corporate personality.4 Therefore, the term
"joint subsidiary" will be used interchangeably with the broader
venture." Most joint subsidiaries will have only two
term "joint
"parents," 5 which will share the stock of the venture equally, with
each parent having a veto over decisions on the joint venture's
activities.' Of course, a joint venture may have more than two
parents or may be open to future participation by additional enter1. Other expressions may be used to refer to virtually the same concept. In
the narrow sense of the term, other terms like joint subsidiary, jointly-owned
subsidiary, or fifty-fifty corporation may be used. See Mok, The Jointly-Owned
Subsidiary ("Joint Venture") and Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, in EUROPEAN
COMPETITION POLICY 120 (1973).
2. Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on
the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. Rnv. 1007, 1007 (1969).
3. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIrIES, FoURTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 25 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FoURTH REPORT]; Boyle, The Joint
Subsidiary:An Economic Appraisal,5 ANTITRUST BULL. 303 (1960); Tractenberg,
Joint Ventures on the Domestic Front:A Study in Uncertainty,8 ANTITRUST BULL.
797, 798 (1963).
4. There may be situations where a parent will constitute a group of controlled
undertakings, each having a separate legal personality.

5. The term "parents" will be used throughout this article to refer to the
enterprises which own and control the joint venture.
6. Mok, supra note 1, at 121.
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prises.1 Stock in the joint subsidiary may also be divided unequally
between the parents.
The various relationships which can result from formation of a
joint venture exist on two levels: (1) between or among the parents;
and (2) between the joint venture and each parent. At the first
level, assuming that only two parents exist, the parents may have
the following relationships:
1. horizontal-where both actually compete in the production,
manufacture, or sale of like commodities within the same market;
2. horizontal complementary-where both are engaged in the same
activity but i'n different geographic areas, or each producing different but related commodities in the same market (e.g., where one is
a manufacturer of small calculators and the other a manufacturer
of large computers;
3. vertical complementary-where one sells to or buys from the
other; or
4. conglomerate-where each is unrelated to the other.8
At the second level, the joint venture's relationship with a parent
may also be either horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate. Naturally,
its relationship to one parent may differ from its relationship to the
other. The potential for anticompetitive effects is greatest when
the joint venture and its parents are all horizontally related, and
is least likely when the parties are unrelated.
III.
A.

ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFEcrs OF FORMATION

Direct Effects on Actual and Potential Competition

Formation of the joint venture may directly affect either actual
or potential competition between firms. A direct effect on actual
competition will result where the joint venture is formed to perform certain activities in a market in which the parents are presently competing. If the parents terminate their individual performance of the joint venture's task, yet continue to participate in other
basic activities in the concerned market, the creation of the joint
venture normally will eliminate or substantially curtail competition between the parents in that particular market.' For example,
if several independent producers of widgets create a joint subsidi7. See, e.g., KEWA, 19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 51 ) 15 (1976); United Reprocessors, 19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 51) 7 (1976).
8. Mok, supra note 1, at 123-24.
9. Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: A
Summary Assessment, 21 ANTrrRUST BULL. 453, 456 (1976); Pitofsky, supra note

2, at 1012.
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ary to sell their products, price competition between the parents
will be eliminated. None of the independent producers would market its own products individually and prices would be determined
jointly. The same is true on the supply side, where the widget
producers create a subsidiary to act as a joint purchasing agency
for the purchase of raw materials.10 Similarly, where the subsidiary
is formed for joint research, competition between the parents over
improved production methods, product quality, or even selling efforts may be eliminated."
Actual competition between a parent and outside firms may also
be affected by joint venture formation. First, where the parents are
vertically complementary and the joint subsidiary is horizontally
related to one, formation of the subsidiary may restrain competition between the horizontal parent and outside firms."2 Competitors of that parent may be effectively foreclosed from doing business with the non-horizontal parent. Second, where the joint venture is vertically related to the parents and possesses a natural
monopoly over a particular stage of activity, competitors of the
parents will usually be foreclosed from doing business with the
joint subsidiary'-a so-called "bottleneck joint venture." Finally,
where the joint venture is vertically related to the parents as a
supplier to them, competitors of the joint venture may be foreclosed from doing business with the parents."
The term "potential competition" refers to the prospect that a
firm will enter a market as a new entrant." The effect of de novo
entry will be the addition of a new and independent competitor
in the particular market with a theoretically beneficial effect
on actual competition. In the joint venture context, the term
10. See generally Brodley, supra note 9, at 456, 466-71; Pitofsky, supra note
2, at 1012-13.
11. Henkel/Colgate, 15 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 14) 14 (1972); Pitofsky, supra
note 2, at 1012.
12. Mok, supra note 1, at 125.
13. Brodley, supra note 9, at 467-69. See also Mok, supra note 1, at 128. Mok
discusses United States v. National City Lines, 186 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 916 (1951). In that case a bus transportation service sold preferred stock to producers of various bus parts. The arrangement was condemned
under the Sherman Act because competitors of the stockholders were precluded
from selling to the transportation service.
14. Brodley, supra note 9, at 467.
15. Bellis, Potential Competition and Concentration Policy: Relevance to
EEC Antitrust, 10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 23, 24 (1976); see Mok, supra note 1, at

125; Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1018-19.
16.

"If [a firm] enters de novo, a number of beneficial effects on competitive

conditions are likely to follow. First, it can be expected that the building of new

378

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:373

"potential competition" may also describe the likelihood that one
or more of the parents would enter the joint venture's market independently, but for the joint venture. 7 If a sufficient number would
otherwise have entered the market, then the formation of the joint
subsidiary has effectively reduced the number of potential participants in the market, with a consequent detrimental impact upon
competition. 8 It may be difficult to determine whether a particular
parent firm would otherwise have entered the market. 9 Naturally,
clear evidence" that a parent actually intended to enter independently may sometimes exist.2 The American experience, however,
has indicatedthat evidence of a subjective nature will often be
equivocal 2 and unreliable. 3 Consequently, the determination
capacity in the industry, by expanding supply, will bring a downward pressure
on prices and erode the market power of existing firms. Second, the presence of a
new competitor may also disrupt pdssible collusive patterns among market
firms." Bellis, supra note 15, at 24 (footnotes omitted).
17. Potential competition obviously becomes important in those situations
where at least one of the parents is not in actual competition with respect to the
particular market for which the joint venture was formed. This would include the
situation where the parents are actually competing in the joint venture's product
market, but the joint venture is formed to enter a new geographic market.
18. See Bellis, supra note 15, at 25.
19. See id. at 28-32; Brodley, supra note 9, at 460, 473, 477; Pitofsky, supra
note 2, at 1019-29.
20. If subjective evidence is relied upon, "there is no assurance that the current feelings of management about entry are in any way indicative of what the
firm is actually going to do in the future." Bellis, supra note 15, at 29 (footnotes
omitted); see Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1020, 1022.
21. "[C]hecking corporate files may sometimes unearth very convincing evidence as to the firm's future plans. A strong argument that the firm is a potential
entrant can indeed be made if documents are found clearly establishing that the
firm had decided to enter the market under a procompetitive form ..

Bellis,

supra note 15, at 28.
22. In looking at the facts of United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S.
158 (1964), Pitofsky concludes:
[A]ll that any reasonable observer could conclude by a subjective test is
that it was an extremely close question what Olin would have done with
respect to independent entry, that fully informed and experienced executives could have reached different conclusions on the proper course of action, and that it would simply be impossible, at the time of trial, to decide
what that hypothetical decision would have been.
Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1023. See also Brodley, supra note 9, at 477.
23. "Passing the fact that a subjective test requires an extensive investigation
through a maze of evidence, its main disadvantage is that it lends itself easily to
all sorts of manipulation by the interested firm. As Justice Marshall rightly
observed in the Falstaff case [410 U.S. 526, 568 (1972)] 'any statement of future
intent (by the firm) will be inherently self-serving.' " Bellis, supra note 15, at 2829 (footnotes omitted).
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should be an objective one.2 ' In a few cases arising under the Sherman Act,2 American courts have arguably adopted such an objective test, finding a high probability of entry based upon the current
lines of commerce in which the prospective entrant competes, and
its economic interest in entering the market."6 Business posture is
one indication of a firm's capacity to enter the market, and it has
been suggested that a firm's capacity and interest are relevant
factors in an objective determination,2 as well as consideration of
whether independent entry would have made available an acceptable level of profit.2 The Commission of the European Communities
has adopted an objective test, focusing on factors indicating the
firm's ability to compete, and has completely ignored subjective
elements."

Whatever test is used, one of three relevant probabilities might
be found: (1) two or more parents could have (or "would have" if

a subjective test is used) entered the market but for the joint
venture; (2) only one parent could have entered; or (3) none of the
parents could have entered." Where two or more parents could
have otherwise entered, formation of the joint venture will obviously have a direct effect on competition. The entry of only one
new firm in the formh of a joint venture, rather than the independent parent firms, is in effect an agreement between the two or

more potential entrants to share the market.3 1 When these firms
24. Bellis, supra note 15, at 29; Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1024-29.
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
26. Brodley, supra note 9, at 459-60.
27. Bellis, supra note 15, at 29; Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1024-25. See also
Brodley, supra note 9, at 458, 460.
28. Bellis, supra note 15, at 29; Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1028. Pitofsky
admits that such a criterion might give rise to complex problems, but suggests
that without it the other criteria are insufficient.
29. Bellis, supra note 15, at 35-36. Bellis cites the following Commission decisions: Sopelem, 15 J.O. Comm. EuR. (No. L 13) 47 (1972); Wild-Leitz, 15 J.O.
Comm. EuR. (No. L 61) 27 (1972); Jaz-Peter, 12 J.O. Comm. EUR. (No. L 195) 5
(1969); Clima Chappe6-Buderus, 12 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 195) 1 (1969); Alliance de Constructeurs Frangais de Machines-Outils, 11 J.O. Comm. EUR. (No. L
201) 1 (1968). Bellis also cites the Quinine Cartelcases before the Court of Justice
of the European Communities as indicating the Court's acceptance of the Commission viewpoint: Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission of the European
Communities, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Comm. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8085;
Buchler & Co. v. Commission of the European Communities, [1967-1970 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8084; ACF Chemiefarma N.V. v. Commission
of the European Communities, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] ComM..MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8083.
30. Mok, supra note 1, at 125; Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1012, 1019.
31. See Mok, supra note 1, at 129.

380

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11.373

are all horizontally related and the joint venture is formed to enter
a new geographic market, the effect on competition may be so
pronounced that it can be equated with an elimination of actual
competition."2 Regardless of the particular configuration, however,
if two or more parents had the ability to enter and did not, the
effect on competition is substantial. If only one parent could have
entered independently, the effect will vary, depending on whether
one or more of the parents is already active in the market for which
the joint venture was formed. If none of the parents is already
active in the joint venture's market, the formation of the joint
venture causes no direct loss to potential competition, assuming
that the joint venture is as efficient a competitor as the parent
would have been.33 On the other hand, if the joint venture is formed
to operate in a market where a parent is already active, arguably
no new competitive force is added to the market, at least where the
already competing parent can substantially influence the business
policies of the joint venture.34 Consequently, if the other parent
would have independently entered the market but for the formation of the joint venture, its failure to do so does reduce the future
number of firms in the market, thereby reducing potential competition.35 If none of the parents could have otherwise entered, hypothetically there is no direct effect on potential competition, since
formation of the joint venture creates a new competitor which.
would not otherwise have existed.
B. Indirect Effects on Competition
There are also indirect effects which may result from formation
of the joint subsidiary. These effects are actually possible results
of joint operation of the venture. The most significant has been
labeled "group effect":37 the danger that legitimate collusion be32. Brodley, supra note 9, at 459-60.
33. Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1060.
34. Id.
35. United States case law indicates that where one parent is in the market
and the other is not and where certain factors are present, the joint venture will
probably be held unlawful under the Clayton Act. The factors are "where (1) the

in-the-market parent has a monopoly or dominant market position, (2)the other
parent is a substantial, clearly recognized potential entrant, and (3) there are no

other, or very few other potential entrants ...... Brodley, supra note 9, at 476.
36. See Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1049-59.
37.

Sidmar, in

EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, THE HIGH AUTHORITY,
REPORT ON THE AcTivrrIEs OF THE COMMUNITY, pts. 346-49, at 320-25
[hereinafter cited as Sidmar I, 11th GENERAL REPORT]; see Uinssen, Joint

llth GENERAL
(1963)
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tween the parents over the joint venture's affairs will spill over into
other aspects of the parent's activities. 8 The "group effect" is also
called the "common corporate meeting ground"'" effect, referring
to the risk that individual parents, meeting to make decisions
regarding the joint venture's business affairs, "may end up by
regulating their [own] conduct in accordance with policy lines
jointly determined in the interest of the operation of the new joint
venture."4 The essential concern in this regard is not that the
parents will actually enter collateral restrictive agreements or undertake concerted practices, but that they will have the
opportunity to do so,41 and that the greater the opportunity the
greater the probability that they will exercise it. One commentator
expresses "justifiable doubt that business strategists can treat one
another as belligerents in one market when they are allies in another.""2 Another author states that "it is inconceivable that firms
engaged cooperatively in one industrial area would not act the
same way in others." 3 It has been suggested by other commentators, however, that this opportunity does not necessarily increase
the probability of collusion, since "there are so many opportunities
for competitor collaboration already available to business managers so inclined that it seems unwarranted to give much weight to
the additional opportunity supplied by regular meetings among
representatives of the parent companies in connection with the
joint ventures' business affairs. '44 Whether or not the opportunity
is viewed as necessarily increasing the probability of collusion, one
generalization has come to be accepted: The group effect risk is
greatest where the parents are actual competitors and diminishes
rapidly as their relationship moves from horizontal complementary or vertical complementary to conglomerate. 45
Subsidiaries;The S.H. V.-Chevron Case, 13 CoMM.MKT. L. REv. 105, 108 (1976);
Mok, supra note 1, at 126.
38. Brodley, supra note 9, at 478; Linssen, supra note 37, at 108, 110; Pitofsky,
supra note 2, at 1013-14, 1032-35.
39. Mok, supra note 1, at 125 (quoting Boyle).
40. FouRTH REPORT, supra note 3, at 26.
41. See Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1032.
42. Mok, supra note 1, at 126 (quoting Dixon, Joint Ventures:-What is Their
Impact on Competition?, 7 ANTITRUST BuLL. 397, 407. (1962)).
43. United States v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., 92 F. Supp.
(D. Mass. 1950).
44. See Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1033.
45. See FouRTH REPORT, supra note 3, at 26; Mok, supra note 1, at 126; Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1030-31, 1034-35. See also Brodley, supra note 9, at 481;
Linssen, supra note 37, at 108.
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Where the joint venture competes with the parents in the same
product and geographic market, as where all produce and sell a
standardized product, the group effect can necessarily be inferred
as long as the market share of each parent is so substantial that
each must consider the other's prices in setting its own. 6 Where
such a configuration is involved, the following results may be expected:
Obviously the parent companies in setting prices at which the joint
venture will sell, must take into account the effect of any such sales
on their own sales volume, and each can use its fifty percent stock
ownership to' block sales by the joint venture at undesirable price
levels. By the same token, each parent company will have to peg its
own prices at a level which will not substantially undercut competitive prices of the venture so as to avoid the awkward situation in
which it undersells its own subsidiary. 7
In agreeing on the joint venture's prices, the parents are effectively
adopting mutually agreeable prices for their own products.
In other configurations, the inference is often not as conclusive
and may have to be supported by additional evidence of collaboration. Additional evidence may be necessary even where the parents
are actual competitors such as where the joint venture's output is
either sold separately by each parent or is used by the parents as
raw material.48 In order to make their own management decisions,
In the FourthReport the Commission stated: "Even in the absence of particularized agreements or concerted practices, it can be assumed that restrictive
arrangements are more likely to be made in cases in which the parties involved
are in effect competitors." FOURTH REPORT, supra note 3, at 26. "[The common

meeting ground theory does not play a big part if the parents are not competitors,
and no part at all if the parents are completely unrelated ....

Mok, supra note

1, at 126.
On the basis of relevant American decisions Brodley concludes that a few
tentative principles regarding group effect may be propounded. The first and
foremost principle is that,
the stronger and more direct the existing competitive relationship between
the parents, the greater the anticompetitive risk. Second, if there is evidence of parent collusion relating to the joint venture's line of business,
either prior to the formation of the joint venture of thereafter, the anticompetitive risk increases. Third, the specific management and operating arrangement governing the joint venture can increase or decrease the risk of
collaborative action between the parents. Fourth, the greater the economic
incentives for collusive action, the greater the anticompetitive risk.
Brodley, supra note 9, at 480-91.
46. Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1034.
47. Id.
48. "In both cases the parents, in order to make sensible investment and
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the parents will have to agree on the joint venture's level of production via an exchange of data about each other which could lead to
uniformity of action inter sese. Since this data is probably available through other sources, however, additional proof of parental
collusion is necessary before the group effect inference can be
drawn. It is not clear whether all authors agree on the latter point.
As will be seen later, the Commission of the European Communities draws the inference in the above type cases with respect to
production and investment, but not with respect to price-at least
where the parents themselves produce more of the concerned products than the joint venture. 9
Another indirect effect which may occur is termed the "stifling"
effect. The stifling effect involves the risk that when joint venture
growth begins to threaten a parent's own plans, it will be stifled
by the parent. The risk is obviously greatest where the joint venture actually competes with one or both parents, but will also exist
where product or geographic expansion is contemplated for the
joint venture into an area in which one or more of the parents are
also contemplating entry." Where the relationship between the
parents and the joint venture is basically conglomerate, the risk is
probably insignificant.51
IV.

REGULATION OF ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

A.

Article 85, Paragraph1 and Mergers

The principal provision of the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community (EEC Treaty) for regulating anticompetitive agreements and concerted practices between enterprises is
article 85. Under paragraph 1 of this article,
The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common
management decisions, would have to agree in advance as to the capacity and

level of operation of the joint venture, and the exchange of data between the
parent companies would tell each company a good deal about the future marketing intentions of the other. In certain market settings-for example, a tight oligopoly market with fully standardized products-an exchange of that kind of information might tend to facilitate uniform price conventions and may have to be

outlawed, or at least regulated, under the antitrust laws. But anticompetitive
tendencies, if any, would be generated here by an exchange of information which
may be available to alert business managers through other sources." Id. at 1035.
49. Solmer, 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 49) 13 (1975); see text accompanying
notes 119-20 infra; notes 165-69 infra.
50. Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1035.
51. Id. at 1038.

384

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11.373

Market and shall hereby be prohibited: any agreements between
enterprises, any decisions by associations of enterprises and any
concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between the
Member States and which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common
Market .... 52
It might be assumed that formation of a joint venture causing one
or more of the anticompetitive effects discussed previously would
clearly be subject to the article 85, paragraph 1 prohibition if the
"affect trade between Member States" requirement were also met,
but this is not necessarily the case.
Most joint ventures are neither genuine cartels nor genuine
mergers.5 3 On the other hand, some are clearly cartels and others
are "more like mergers, especially if the parents cease their independent activities and continue their existence merely as holding
companies." 54 The Commission has adopted the policy that article
85 will not apply to concentrations which are intended to bring
about a permanent change in the ownership of the enterprises
concerned.55 Mergers in which several formerly independent enterprices regroup under one economic direction can meet this requirement. 5 The Commission, however, stated in its 1966 Memorandum on the Concentration of Enterprises in the Common
Market that where a merger occurs in the form of a joint venture
and the parents thereafter remain economically independent, the
arrangement will be carefully scrutinized to determine whether,
apart from changes in ownership, the parents are entering into and
applying restrictive agreements or engaging in concerted practices."7
52. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
art. 85, para. 1, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].

53. Mok, supra note 1, at 132.
54. Id.
55.

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, MEMORANDUM TO THE GovERN-

MENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES ON CONCENTRATION OF ENTERPRISES IN THE COMMON

MARKET, CCH COMM. MKT. REP. No. 26,
58, at 27 (1966) (out of print)
[hereinafter cited as 1966 MEMO]. The 1966 Memo is summarized in COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH), New Developments (Apr. 1965-Dec. 1969), 9081 at 8171-73.
56. Id. 21, at 13.
57. Id. 58, at 27. The Commission's advisory group of professors had recom-

mended that article 85 should apply to concentrations where the enterprises
involved remained juridically distinct units following the concentration. The

Commission rejected this view, primarily because it felt that too many concentrations would fall under article 85, paragraph 1. Reasonable concentrations would
have to escape via article 85, paragraph 3, which was considered inappropriate
for concentrations. Id.

53-56, at 24-26; see Canellos & Silber, Concentrations
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B.

ConcentratedJoint Ventures

Since publication of the 1966 Memorandum, the Commission
has dealt with several joint venture cases and has clarified its
earlier opinion. Its present position is that "joint ventures may
amount either to a form of restrictive practice or to a merger" and
that whether a given joint venture falls within either category "can
only be settled in the light of specific circumstances on a case by
case basis.""5 Concentrated joint ventures, however, are clearly
considered to be an exception. Normally, formation of a joint subsidiary which causes the restrictive effects discussed previously
and which affects trade between Member States will fall within the
prohibition of paragraph 1. Nevertheless, it is appropriate here to
discuss the exception before the rule. A finding of concentration
would seem to obviate the necessity of examining formation of a
joint subsidiary in light of the requirements of article 85, paragraph 1.11
It is important to note that formation of joint ventures may
create a concentration at two different levels. Formation will always be treated as bringing about a concentration between the
joint subsidiary on the one hand, and the parents on the other,
because the parents acting jointly can control the activity of the
subsidiary. This first level of concentration will be referred to as
"joint venture" concentration. It is also possible that a joint venture formation may effect a concentration between or among the
parents. It is this second level, which will be referred to as
in the Common Market, 7 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 5, 152 (1970); Mok, supra note 1,

at 136. The Commission appears not to have totally rejected the advisory group's
view point where joint ventures are involved, however. See 1966 MEMO, supranote
55, 58, at 27.
58. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SixTH REPORT ON COMPEMTION
POLICY 38 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SIXTH REPORT].

59. Apparently, if the joint venture parents are deemed to have merged, the
Commission's focus is not upon whether the requirements for prohibition under
article 85, paragraph 1 are present. In fact, once a merger is found, the joint
venture agreement should be immune to prohibition. However, comments by the
Commission in the Sixth Report and in decisions to be discussed in this article
indicate that this is not a hard and fast rule. At any rate, whether or not merger
results in immunity, the Commission will issue a negative clearance in accordance with Regulation 17, just as it would if the formation agreement had been
examined in light of article 85, paragraph 1, and the requirements for prohibition
therein had been found lacking. In re Application of Steenkolen-

Handelsvereeniging NV & Chevron Oil Europe, 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 38)
14 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SHV/Chevron]; see Regulation 17, 5 J.O. COMM.
204 (1962).

EUR.
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"parental" concentration, which has raised difficulties in attempting to apply article 85, paragraph 1 to certain joint ventures. When
only a joint venture concentration is present, the formation agreement will always be scrutinized under article 85. Where a parental
concentration is also present, however, the Commission has
adopted a policy to the effect that article 85 will generally not
apply.
1. Concentration Between the Parents
(a) Total Integration.-The Commission has ruled that where
enterprises transfer all their individual assets to a joint subsidiary
and become holding companies, article 85 will generally not apply
because "such a situation will usually be considered to constitute
a merger.""0 For example, in 1964 a Belgian photography firm,
Agfa, and a German photography firm, Gavaert, merged by forming two equally and jointly owned subsidiaries with identical
boards. Both firms transferred all of their individual assets to the
two subsidiaries.n61 The Commission viewed this as a total integration, the parents retaining their identities only as management
holding companies with no economic independence." The parents
article
had effected a total parental concentration. Consequently,
3
85 did not apply to the formation agreement.
(b) PartialIntegration.-When the parents transfer all assets
related to a particular activity in a given product market to a joint
subsidiary and both continue to retain individual assets and engage in other activities in the same market, no parental concentration is deemed to be present." For example, where two firms are
engaged in production and marketing activities in the widget market and transfer only their marketing assets to a joint subsidiary,
supra note 58, at 38; FoURTH

60.

SIXTH REPORT,

61.

LAYTON, CRoss FRONTIER MERGER IN EUROPE, How

REPORT,

supra note 3, at 26.

CAN GOVERNMENT HELP?

25 (1971). Two other firms, Dunlop and Pirelli, merged by creating holding companies into which they transferred their assets and operations. Each acquired
large shares of the other's subsidiaries. The Commission reached the same conclusion regarding this merger as it had reached for Agfa/Gevaert. FoURTH REPORT,
supra note 3, at 26.
62. FOURTH REPORT, supra note 3, at 26.

63. The language used by the Commission in the Sixth Report indicates that

this may not always be the case. "The prohibition will not in general be taken to
apply to cases in which the parent companies transfer all their assets .... Such
a situation will usually be considered to constitute a merger." SIXTH REPORT,

supra note 58, at 38 (emphasis added).
64. See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
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they have created a joint selling agency which is clearly prohibited
by article 85.65
Suppose, however, that two parents transfer all of their assets
related to a particular activity on a given product market to joint
subsidiaries. One of the parents continues to participate in different activities on the concerned market, and the other parent no
longer participates at all in that market but continues to be active
in others. This was the situation in SHVChevron.6 One parent,
Chevron, was primarily engaged in various activities in the petroleum market; the other, SHV, primarily participated in activities
in markets other than that of petroleum. 7 Each had independent
distribution networks for certain petroleum products, however.
They set up a number of jointly and equally owned subsidiaries to
which they transferred all of their assets relating to distribution of
the petroleum products. Consequently, SHV virtually disappeared
from the petroleum market as an independent entity." Both parents ceased to engage independently in the distribution of the
products in question and entered into an agreement not to compete
with respect to these products without prior consent of the other.
If SHV had been a producer of petroleum products and had
otherwise remained in the petroleum market, this arrangement
might have been nothing more than the creation of a prohibited
joint selling agency as mentioned above. The Commission found,
however, that a real concentration had been created, not only between each parent and the joint venture, but also between the
parents themselves. 9 The Commission stressed the "lasting
65. SIXTH REPORT, supra note 58, at 38; FouRTH REPORT, supra note 3, at 25.
66. SHV/Chevron, 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 38) at 14.
67. Chevron belonged to an integrated international petroleum group which
engaged in crude oil production, oil refining and distribution, and petrochemicals. SHV was primarily engaged in coal distribution, chain stores, transport, trade in technical products, and construction. SHV/Chevron, 18 O.J. EuR.
COMM. (No. L 38) at 15. See Linssen, supra note 37, at 105 n.1.
68. By virtue of SHV's oil exploration activity, however, there was always the
chance that it would come into possession of crude oil in the future.
69. The language the Commission used to make this point is a bit confusing
in view of the language which had been used by the High Authority in the decisions under the ECSC Treaty. The Commission said: "For both Chevron and
SHV this brings about a real concentration between each of them and their joint
subsidiaries, confined to the distribution of the products specified by the agreement." SHV/Chevron, 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 38) at 15. This could be interpreted as referring to only a joint venture concentration between the subsidiary
and each parent. However, in view of the other aspects of the SHVChevron
decision and of the Commission's comments in the FourthReport, the statement
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change" in the structure of the parents' companies brought about
by the transfers of assets.7" SHV had ceased to be a wholesale buyer
of the relevant products and both parents had ceased to retail the
products separately. "Most of the other aspects of the agreement
suggest that what is really happening is that the distribution side
of Chevron's and SHV's business is being integrated into the new
trading structure of the Calpam subsidiaries."'" The Commission
also pointed out that the subsidiaries were formed for a period of
suggested a permanent transfer of assets by
50 years and said this
72
the parents to them.
In the Fourth Report on Competition Policy, the Commission
termed the SHVlChevron situation a partial integration because
the parents retained economic activities in fields other than those
turned over to the joint ventures. It stated further than in respect
to the activities turned over to the subsidiaries, the parents took
the form of holding companies "after transferring to the joint ventures

. . .

the necessary infrastructure for the supply of the rele-

vant product. They thereby lost their economic independence on
the markets concerned, where they could act only through their
joint subsidiaries, which had been created through transfers of
assets needed for their operation."73 In the Sixth Report on Competition Policy, the Commission attempted to distill from the above
the essence of its policy on partial mergers. Four points were
stressed: First, to effect an excluded partial merger, a transfer of
assets seems to be required. Second, a merger will be present only
in exceptional cases. Third, such cases will arise "only where the
parent companies completely and irreversibly abandon business in
the area covered by the joint venture .

.

... ,7 Finally, the Com-

mission added a factor not previously considered-the partial intemust have been intended to mean not only a joint venture concentration, but also
a parental one.
70. Linssen argues that the change might not necessarily be all that "lasting."
[F]or Chevron and Standard Oil of California, as world-wide producers
and distributors, no serious obstacles appeared to exist to the resumption
of distribution of petroleum products in so small a geographic area (Benelux, Denmark and Germany). SHV, an important trading and transport

company, might also have been able to take up distribution of the products

again.

Linssen, supra note 37, at 112-13.
71. SHV/Chevron, 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 38) at 15.

72. Such a contractual term could easily be avoided by mutual consent of the
parties. Linssen, supra note 37, at 113.

73. FOURTH REPORT, supra note 3, at 27.
74. SIXTH REPORT, supra note 58, at 38-39.
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gration must not "weaken competition in other areas, and particularly in related areas, where the firms involved remain formally
independent of each other."75
The partial merger policy was further clarified in the case of De
7 6 The issue therein was apparently raised because one
LavallStork.
of the parent firms, Stork, transferred certain assets (its plant
facilities) to the joint venture. The Commission again stressed the
factors set forth in the Sixth Report, in finding no partial merger
present. It is obvious from De Laval/Stork that the most important
question in the partial merger context is whether the parents remain actual or potential competitors in the joint venture's market
after the formation of the joint venture. To answer this question,
the Commission applies the "complete and irreversible abandonment" test, which involves analysis of two questions: (1) whether
the parents have given up "all their existing capacity to compete
actually or potentially" and (2) whether the parents have ceased
77
"to do business in the industry."
The first question relates to parental transfer of assets to the
joint venture. The Commission's reference to this criterion in De
Laval/Stork creates a bit of semantic confusion, since in one paragraph the Commission implies that only one parent must abandon
business in the "area covered by the joint venture" and in the next
paragraph the Commission requires that "the parties" give up all
their existing capacity to compete, presumably in that same area.
Both requirements, though seemingly contradictory, are necessary
for a finding of partial merger, although the scope and meaning of
the terms used by the Commission require further clarification.
This point is best demonstrated by example. If both parents turn
over all their existing capacity for marketing widgets to a joint
venture and yet continue to manufacture the product, nothing
more than a joint sales firm, which is clearly prohibited by article
85, paragraph 1, has been created. However, if at least one parent
ceases all manufacturing and other activities in the widget market,
though remaining active in other unrelated product markets, and
transfers jointly with the other parent all its existing capacity for
marketing the involved product, then an excluded partial merger
will result." Obviously, the same is true when both parents cease
all activities in the widget market, remain active in others, and
75.

Id. at 39.

76. De Laval/Stork, 20 O.J. Eua. COMM. (No. L 215) at 15.
77. Id. at 16.
78.

This was the situation in SHV/Chevron. See text accompanying notes 107-

10 supra. This situation assumes that only two parents exist and that all other
relevant criteria are met.
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transfer all assets relating to activities in the widget market to a
joint venture. In fact, the second question seems to make this a
prerequisite for partial merger, raising additional problems in interpreting the requirement that only one parent need abandon
joint venture-related business. The second question is whether the
parties have ceased to do business in the industry." If "industry"
includes all activities in the relevant product market, the Commission must provide additional interpretation. This was clearly not
the case in SHV/Chevron and any further endorsement of the
above interpretation would in fact overrule that decision.
The De Laval/Stork decision also demonstrates that other factors will be considered in determining whether the "complete and
irreversible abandonment" test has been met. Terms in the formation agreement may be indicative of the parties' intent. For example, terms which limit the joint venture's activities to a specific
territory and restrict parental activities in the joint venture's area
would not be required once the parents actually abandon business
in that area. Furthermore, terms of the agreement which limit the
period of life of the joint venture to a relatively short term (five
years in De Laval/Stork) and which give the parents a right to
terminate the joint venture agreement will also be viewed as indicating less than complete and irreversible abandonment.80
The opinion in De Laval/Stork also mentions the criterion referred to in the Sixth Report, regarding the effect of formation on
parental competition in areas outside the field of the joint venture.
The Commission's reference to this effect indicates that the
"complete and irreversible abandonment" test is only one of two
important tests, both of which must be present before the Commission will find an excluded partial merger. In determining that the
De Laval/Stork joint venture did not constitute such a merger, the
Commission stated:
It is not the case that at least one of the companies has completely
and irreversibly abandoned business in the area covered by the joint
venture nor that it is certain that the pooling of this area of business
will weaken competition in other areas, particularly in related industries, where the firms involved remain formally independent of
each other.'
This statement implies that, despite a finding of complete and
irreversible abandonment, if the Commission finds a potential for
79. De Laval/Stork, 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 215) at 16.
80.

Id.

81. Id. at 15-16.
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the spill-over of parental cooperation into other areas of parental
activity, it will not conclude that an excluded partial merger is
present. Although a likelihood of "spill-over" will exist only where
the parents remain actual competitors in areas other than that of
the joint venture, the full implications of this "spill-over" test will
have to be supplied by the Commission in future decisions and
reports.
The GEC/Weir Sodium Circulatorsdecision,82 which involved a
similar type of spill-over in a non-partial merger context, indicates
that the basis for cooperation in areas outside the field of the joint
venture is the association of executives of the parent firms to conduct the business of the venture. This association would exist in
most partial merger situations as well, but the climate is not as
conducive to cooperation in a partial merger context as when the
"group effect" restriction relates to competition in the joint venture's market. In the latter instance a stronger case for prohibition
can be made because of the generally accepted maxim that the
parents will not compete with the activities of the joint venture
and will therefore govern their own activities in the joint venture's
market in accordance with the policies jointly determined for the
venture.8 3 In the partial merger context, however, the objectionable
effect on competition is merely inferred from the opportunity for
collusion, because executives of the parents must work together to
conduct the affairs of the venture. This is analogous to the situation in which additional evidence of collusion should be present
before a violation of antitrust rules is found.8 4 The Commission has
not yet expressly adopted this viewpoint, however.
(c) Collateral Agreements Not to Compete.-The SHVI
Chevron decision raises another issue: the effect of a finding
of partial merger on a collateral agreement not to compete. As
already mentioned, the SHV/Chevron agreement establishing the
joint subsidiaries contained a collateral or ancillary agreement
under which the parties agreed not to compete with each other
without prior consent with respect to the products turned over to
the subsidiary. Before the decision, the agreement had included an
additional clause whereby the parents agreed not to compete with
respect to other petroleum products not distributed by the joint
82. GEC/Weir Sodium Circulators, 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 327) at 32.
83. Id. at 31; see Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1034; text accompanying notes
45-49 supra.

84. Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1035; note 48 & text accompanying notes 48-49
supra.
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subsidiaries." Since the Commission considered the latter clause
to be covered by article 85, paragraph 1, the parents deleted it. The
Commission found, however, that the agreement not to compete
in the joint venture's market was not prohibited by article 85,
paragraph 1. Unfortunately, the reasoning in the Commission's
decision is not entirely clear."6 The Commission stated that the
agreement assured SHV that the assets turned over to the joint
venture would not depreciate in value as a consequence of competition by Chevron. On the other hand, it stated that Chevron had
no conceivable interest in competing with its own fifty percentowned subsidiaries; moreover, the Commission determined that
SHV was unlikely to reenter the market as a competitor. On the
basis of those three factors, the Commission concluded that the
agreement not to compete in the field of the joint venture could
not be said to involve an "appreciable restriction of competition.""7
With the possible exception of the first point stressed by the Commission, there is nothing in its treatment of the noncompetition
clause to indicate that the Commission considered the agreement
a consequence of the concentration and therefore a dependent restriction not subject to article 85.u Rather, it appears that the
Commission considered the agreement in light of the requirements
for prohibition in paragraph 1 of article 85, and concluded that the
prohibition would not apply because the restriction did not meet
the noticeability criterion read into the third requirement for prohibition in article 85, paragraph 1 by the Commission 9 and Court
of Justice."
85. SHV/Chevron, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 38) at 15. The other products
were lubricating oil, diesel fuel, and petrol in the Benelux area and Denmark. Id.

86.

Cf. Linssen, supra note 37, at 114. Linssen states that, with regard to the

noncompetition clause, the Commission "maintained a curious line of reasoning,

which amounted to a mixture of concentration and cartel arguments." Id.
87. The main agreement between Chevron and SHV also allowed Chevron to
fix the price for asphalt, one of the products to be distributed by the joint venture.
The Commission held that this aspect of the agreement was compatible with
article 85, because only Chevron had sold the particular product before.
SHV/Chevron, 18 O.J. Eun. COMM. (No. L 38) at 15. Apparently the Commission
meant that since the parents had not been in competition over the price of asphalt
prior to formation and that since SHV was unlikely to reenter the market once it

transferred its distribution assets to the subsidiary, there could be no restriction
of competition.
88. For a possibly contrary interpretation, see Linssen, supra note 37, at 114.
89. Commission notice of May 27, 1970, 13 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. C 64) 1, 1-2
(1970).
90. Volk v. ETS Vervaecke, 8 COMM. MKT. L.R. 273 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Volk/Vervaecke].
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In the Sixth Report, however, the Commission adopted a different approach to justify its conclusion in SHV/Chevron that article
85 did not apply to the noncompetition clause. Normally agreements not to compete are manifestly subject to article 85 when
they have their own distinct legal and economic effect. Where such
clauses are stipulated in mergers, a more flexible approach is necessary. The question then becomes whether the clause is acceptable as an integral part of the legitimate purpose of the main agreement. 91 Because the Chevron agreement provided SHV with the
assurance that the value of its transferred assets would not be
reduced, the agreement "was a condition precedent to the formation of the joint venture."9" In short, the agreement not to compete
over joint venture products was upheld because it was an integral
part of the excluded partial merger. The Commission complicated
the issue, however, by reviving the other criteria mentioned in the
decision itself. For example, the Commission attempted to clarify
further its holding in SHV/Chevron by distinguishing it from its
later KEWA decision.9" In KEWA, the Commission held that an
agreement among the parents not to compete in the joint venture's
field was prohibited by article 85, paragraph 1. The Commission
distinguished the SHVChevron noncompetition agreement from
that in KEWA on the basis that the parents in SHV/Chevron were
no longer potential competitors in the joint venture's field, whereas
the KEWA parents were. This distinction is a valid one. However,
the Commission could have clarified its policy regarding collateral
noncompetition agreements by pointing out the most basic distinction between the two decisions: SHV/Chevron was a case involving
partial merger and KEWA was not. An excluded partial merger
finding is premised upon the conclusion that the joint venture
parents are no longer potential competitors in the joint venture's
field and that no cooperation is likely to spill over into areas of
parental activity outside the joint venture's field. Article 85, paragraph 1, will not apply to agreements where the parties are not
actual or potential competitors in the area covered by the agreement and where there is no spill-over effect, at least where the
agreement has no effect on competition with third parties. Consequently, if an excluded partial merger has been effected via formation of a joint venture and if a collateral noncompetition agreement
pertains directly to the joint venture's area of activity, there is no
91.
92.
93.

Srxwm REPORT, supra note 58, at 42.
Id.
19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 51) 15 (1975); see text at notes 144-49 infra.
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basis for the application of article 85, paragraph 1, to the collateral
agreement.
When the noncompetition clause covers areas outside the field
of the joint venture, however, different considerations arise. Generally speaking, the parents will retain freedom to act independently
in non-joint venture areas of activity. Stated differently, the elimination of parental freedom of action outside the field of the joint
venture is not a natural consequence or an integral part of the
formation of an excluded partial merger. As the Commission
stated in its Sixth Report: "[W]here a non-competition clause
agreed by parent companies does not concern a joint venture's area
of activity, it is generally to be considered a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 85(1), whether the joint venture
is regarded as a restrictive agreement or as a merger."94
2.

Applicability of Article 86 to Joint Ventures Effecting
Concentrations Between the Parents

Although in the 1966 Memorandum the Commission felt that
article 85 should not apply to concentrations,15 it reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the applicability of article 86,
which prohibits the abuse of dominant positions. 6 The memorandum described two situations of concentration to which article 86
might apply: where a firm in a dominant position employs abusive
market practices to compel a weaker firm to merge with it; and
where a dominant firm merges with a viable competitor and
thereby eliminates remaining competition on the market. 7 The
Commission felt that the second situation could bring about the
same harmful results as the behavior described in article 86(b),
"the limitation of production, markets or technical development
to the prejudice of consumers." In both situations, the Commission
required that one of the parties to the merger be in a dominant
94.

SixT REPORT, supra note 58, at 42.

95.

1966 MEMO, supra note 55, at 27.

96.

Id.

59, at 27-30. The Commission felt that the obstacles to applying

article 85, see note 57 supra, did not exist for article 86. Article 86 prohibits action
by one or more enterprises, to the extent that such action affects trade between
Member States, whereby improper advantage is taken of a dominant position
within the Common Market or a substantial part thereof. EEC TREATY, supra

note 52, art. 86. The Commission felt that all forms of concentrations could be
treated alike and that under article 86, there would be no problem of revocable
exemptions or mandatory nullity of agreements. 1966 MEMO, supra note 55, at 27;
see Canellos & Silber, supra note 57, at 153.
97. 1966 MEMO, supranote 55, 65, at 29-30; see Canellos & Silber, supra note
57, at 153.
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position. Several commentators have argued, however, that this
need not be the case so long as dominant position results from the
merger. 8 Their argument is based upon a reading of article 86
itself, which prohibits action by one or more enterprises to take
advantage of a dominant position. For example, where a particular
market is oligopolistic, firms participate in the market share in a
sort of collective "economic dominance." If two such firms merge
to acquire the "competitive benefits of consolidating the collective
dominant position in the hands of one entity," then arguably each
participant has taken advantage of the collective dominant position by undertaking to merge. 9 In other words, it is arguable that
two firms not individually in dominant positions could merge so
as to create a dominant position and fall within article 86.
Although the Commission has never expressly adopted this particular reasoning, it has taken a case involving facts similar to the
second situation in the 1966 Memorandum before the Court of
Justice in the Continental Can case"' and received acceptance by
the Court in principle. The Commission had held in its decision
that Continental Can abused its dominant position within the
meaning of article 86 by acquiring a Dutch manufacturer of the
same products, because the acquisition "in practice eliminated
[competition] for the products in question." 1°1 Thus the possibility exists that joint venture formations which fall outside the
sphere of article 85 may be caught by article 86 where they amount
to parental concentrations." 2 It is also arguable that joint venture
formations which do not amount to concentrations between the
parents could fall within the Continental Can rationale where the
formation has the effect of substantially eliminating competition
between the parents. Article 85 would normally apply in such
cases, however.
The Commission has not expressly adopted the reasoning with
regard to non-dominant firms which create a dominant position by
98.

P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, ROME CONFERENCE REPORT

34-35; Canellos &

Silber, supra note 57, at 162 (citing Mestm~cker, Unternehmenzusammen-

schlusse nach Artikel 86 EWG Vertrag, in 2 FESTSCHRIFr

FUR WALTER HALLSTEIN

348 (The Combination of EnterprisesunderArticle 86 EEC Treaty, in MEMORIAL
VOLUME FOR WALTER HALLsTEIN)).

99. Id.
100. Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, 12 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Continental Can].
101. Commission Decision of Dec. 9, 1971, 15 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 7) 26
(1972), 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D31 (1972). Complete elimination of competition
need not be required. See Continental Can, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 225.
102. See Mok, supra note 1, at 135.
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merger; nevertheless, such reasoning could also be applied in the
joint venture area. The formation of a concentrated and dominant
joint venture by two non-dominant parents could arguably fall
within article 86. The Commission appears to ignore this possibility in the SHV/Chevron decision, stating only that the Continental
Can type situation was impossible in the context of
3 Neither Chevron nor SHV, said the Commission,
SHV/Chevron. ,0
had a sufficient share of the market to hold a dominant position.
One author has suggested that the Commission failed to consider
the possibility because it was unnecessary "since Calpam's market
share was unlikely to constitute a dominant position."'" 4 By the
same reasoning, however, it was also unnecessary to mention the
Continental Can-type possibility. The more likely explanation is
that the Commission was unwilling at this point to adopt the
"dominant joint venture" reasoning.' 5
A number of the problems resulting from the non-applicability
of article 85 and the limited usefulness of article 86 will be obviated
if the Commission's proposal for a Regulation on the Control of
Mergers is adopted by the Council. The regulation would give the
Commission power to prohibit concentrations which hinder effective competition within the Common Market.' 6 Article 85 would
presumably continue to be applicable to independent restrictions
of competition which are not the natural consequence of the
merger. Article 86 would likewise continue to be applicable to concentrations which are outside the scope of the Regulation'07 and
which at least fall within the Continental Can-type situation.
3.

Joint Venture Concentration-Between the Joint Venture
and the Parents

As discussed previously, joint venture formation may effect a
103. See SHV-Chevron, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 38) at 15.
104. Linssen, supra note 37, at 116.
105. Mok, supra note 1, at 135. It should be noted that a dominant joint
venture which abuses its dominance in operation and meets the other requirements of article 86 would certainly be covered by that article. Unlike the other
possibilities, however, in this case the joint venture's existence is not in issue.
106. The Commission has proposed to the council a draft regulation under the
EEC Treaty on the control of concentrations between undertakings, based on
articles 87 and 235 of the Treaty. Draft Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 9586 [hereinafter cited as Draft Regulation]. It appears doubtful that

the regulation will be adopted by the Council in the immediate future.
107.

(1975).

See also D.

BAROUNOS,

D.

HALL

& J.

JAMES,

EEC ANnmusT

LAW

199
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concentration at two different levels: (1) between the parents (parental concentration) and (2) between the joint venture or joint
subsidiary, and the parents (jObint venture concentration). Formation of a joint subsidiary will always be treated as bringing about
a joint venture concentration, because the parents acting jointly
can control the activity of the subsidiary. Total and partial parental concentrations are governed to a certain extent by the Commission's policy that concentrations are not generally subject to the
article 85, paragraph 1, prohibition. The Commission has adopted
a different view with respect to joint venture concentration.
It may be useful for purposes of perspective to examine the early
policy of another Community institution, the High Authority,'" '
toward anticompetitive effects growing out of joint venture concentration. The High Authority dealt with joint subsidiaries falling
within the jurisdiction of the Treaty Instituting the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty).' 9 The High Authority's
approach is interesting because it concludes that anticompetitive
effects growing out of the joint venture concentration could not be
reached under article 65 of the ECSC Treaty which prohibits restrictive agreements."10
Regulation of competition under the ECSC Treaty must necessarily be different from regulation under the EEC Treaty because
the former contains a provision dealing with the anticompetitive
effects of concentrations in article 66. Paragraph 1 of article 66
requires that transactions creating concentrations, whether by
merger or other means of acquiring control, must receive prior
authorization by the High Authority. Paragraph 2 requires inter
alia that the High Authority authorize the concentration if it finds
that the transaction does not confer power on the persons or enterprises concerned to "hinder effective competition in a substantial
part of the market for those products. . . .""' The Authority ini108. The Commission of the European Communities adopted the role of the
High Authority pursuant to the Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single
Commission for the European Communities, April 8, 1965, 10 J.O. Comm. EuR.
(No. 152) 2 (1967).
109. Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Ap1 18,

1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (1957) [hereinafter cited as ECSC Treaty].
110. The Court of Justice has ruled that "a common intention inspired the
drafting of" article 85 of the EEC Treaty and article 65 of the ECSC Treaty.
Geitling Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft v. High Authority, [1962] C.J. Comm.

E. Rec. 165, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 113, 150 (1962).
111.

ECSC Treaty, supra note 109, art. 66, para. 2. The other requirements

are that the persons or enterprises not have power "to influence prices, to control
or restrain production or marketing ... ; or to evade the rules of competition
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tially felt that agreements to form joint subsidiaries fell outside

both articles 65 and 66.112 The first indication of a change in attitude appeared in the August/Thyssen decision of September 27,
1961, " in which the High Authority authorized a steel producer to
acquire 50 percent of the shares of another steel producer. Prior to
this transaction, the acquired firm had been solely owned by a firm
primarily engaged in the distribution of iron and steel products.
The issue before the Authority was" 4 whether the resulting joint
venture concentration met requirements for authorization in. article 66, paragraph 2. The Authority found that joint control of the
subsidiary would restrict competition between the parents in their
production outside the joint subsidiary. The Authority determined, however, that this restriction was insufficient to warrant
denial of authorization under article 66, paragraph 2." 5
The restriction on competition referred to in August/Thyssen
was labeled the "group effect" in the Sidmar decision of April
1962.111 In Sidmar, four groups of steel producers formed a joint
subsidiary for production and other activities. The Authority
found a joint venture concentration between each parent and the
subsidiary because the parents could jointly determine the activity
of the subsidiary within the meaning of Decision No. 24/54.1 7 No
resulting from the application of the present Treaty, particularly by establishing
an artifically privileged position involving a material advantage in access to supplies or markets." Id.
112. Sidmar I, 11th GENERAL REPORT, pts. 346-49, at 323.
113.

August/Thyssen,

Au213 (1962)

EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, THE HIGH

THORITY, TENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTIvITIES OF THE COMMUNITY

[hereinafter cited as TENTH GENERAL REPORT].
114. The report of the August/Thyssen decision is not in much detail.

115. The High Authority found that the share of the German market affected
was only about 20 percent, which was not a substantial part of the market for
those products. August/Thyssen, TENTH GENERAL REPORT at 214.
116. Sidmar I, 11th GENERAL REPORT at 324.
117. Paragraph 1 of article 66 confers power on the High Authority to define
the elements of control through the acquisition of which concentrations are effected, which it did on May 6, 1954, after consultation with the Council. Decision
of May 6, 1954, No. 24/54, J.O. COMM. EUR. 345 (1954). Elements of control were
defined as "rights or contracts which, either separately or jointly, or having regard
to the considerations of fact and law involved, make it possible to determine how
an undertaking shall operate as regards production, prices, investments, supplies,
sales, and appropriation of profits." Linssen, supra note 37, at 106. Consequently,
since the parents can jointly determine how the joint venture will operate, together they control the joint venture within the meaning of the High Authority's
decision. Because the control of the subsidiary is exercised jointly, formation of
the subsidiary effects a concentration between each parent and the subsidiary
under article 66, paragraph 2.
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parental concentration existed between the parents, however, because none could exercise control over the other either jointly or
severally. Nevertheless, competition between them was bound to
be affected since the independent parents exercised group control
and produced the same or similar products as the subsidiary. Interestingly, however, this "group effect" was held not to constitute an
independent restriction under article 65 because it was "part and
parcel" of group control, i.e., of the joint venture concentration.,
Since it was a natural result of the joint venture concentration, it
would be scrutinized solely under article 66, paragraph 2.111
The notion that "group effect" would not constitute an independent restriction was again applied in the Solmer decision, 120 in
which the Commission allowed the addition of a third parent to a
previously authorized joint venture configuration.' Under the
agreement in Solmer, the subsidiary's products were turned over
entirely to the parents. Each received an amount in proportion to
its capital contribution and distributed its portion through its own
independent sales network. In each case, the parent's own production of the concerned product exceeded that of the joint venture.
The Commission again found only a joint venture concentration
present and held that the group effect would restrict competition
between the parents over investment and production. In this case,
however, the restriction was found patently insufficient to warrant
an examination even under article 66, paragraph 2. Because each
parent marketed its portion of the subsidiary's output independently and each parent's production exceeded that of the joint
venture, it was felt that the group effect would not extend to competition over price or marketing. Consequently, the Commission
did not attempt to gauge the extent of the anticompetitive effects
on investment and production under article 66, paragraph 2.
The High Authority in Solmer felt that the group effect restriction was a natural result of the joint venture concentration. It has
reached a different conclusion in cases in which parents entered
into an actual agreement to further restrict their competition following formation of a subsidiary. After the authorization in the
Sidmar decision, the parents entered an additional agreement to
118. Sidmar I, 11th GENERAL REPORT at 324-25.
119. "The extent of the restrictive effects arising must be assessed at the time
the concentration takes place, so that authorization may have to be refused if the
implications of the concentration, including the group effect, are not in conformity with criteria of article 66." Id.
120. Solmer, 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 49) 13 (1975).
121. See Linssen, supra note 37, at 109.
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create a central bureau for allocating orders among them, to share
profits from the sale of products covered by the agreement, and to
allocate transportation costs.'2 The High Authority found, in effect, that whatever impact "group effect" might have on competition between the parents, they nevertheless retained freedom to
act independently of one another. Consequently, an actual agreement between them which restricted or eliminated this freedom of
action could not be considered a consequence of the concentration
and was thus an independent restriction subject to article 65.
The position of the High Authority under the ECSC Treaty may
be summarized by the following three statements: First, the particular joint subsidiary formations scrutinized were found to involve only joint venture concentrations, which were present because the parents were able to jointly control the activity of the
subsidiary. Second, joint control was found to bring about a "group
effect" restriction on competition between the independent parents which was a natural consequence of joint control and thus not
an independent restriction subject to article 65.'23 Finally, since the
parents still possessed freedom to act independently after the joint
venture concentration despite the group effect, collateral agreements to restrict this freedom were deemed independent of the
concentration and subject to article 65.
It is not clear that this reasoning would be applied to formations
which directly affect competition between the parents. For example, suppose the Sidmar parents had formed the subsidiary to
market their products, thereby eliminating price competition between them. The elimination of competition would clearly be the
natural consequence of formation, which presumably would
amount to a joint venture concentration within the meaning of
Decision No. 24/54. Under the "part and parcel" reasoning, such
a restriction would probably not be considered an independent
restriction for article 65 purposes. It would nevertheless fall within
the scope of article 66, paragraph 2.
The Commission's approach toward joint ventures under the
EEC Treaty has differed from that under the ECSC Treaty, perhaps because the EEC Treaty lacks a provision comparable to
article 66 of the ECSC Treaty.' u The Commission nevertheless
does not view the anticompetitive effects of the joint venture concentration as immune from the EEC Treaty article covering restrictive agreements. In dealing with joint ventures under the pro122. Sidmar, 10 J.O. COMM. EuR. 717 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Sidmar MI].
123. For an opinion on this point, see Linssen, supra note 37, at 110.
124. Draft Regulation, supra note 106.
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visions of the EEC Treaty, the Commission has obviously abandoned the ECSC "part and parcel" approach, especially where
direct effects on parental competition result from formation. Although the Commission has been slow in so stating, this position
is equally clear where the indirect group effect results. Decisions
under the EEC Treaty involving these effects will therefore be
discussed in a separate section.
C.

The Rule: Joint Ventures as Restrictive Agreements

Only total mergers like that of Agfa and Gevaert will usually fall
outside the scope of article 85. Partial mergers will also escape
scrutiny under article 85, but only if the Commission is satisfied
that there is little likelihood of spill-over of parental cooperation
into areas in which the parents remain formally independent.',
Every other arrangement may escape only by either avoiding the
requirements for prohibition in article 85, paragraph 1, or meeting
the conditions for exemption in article 85, paragraph 3. The paragraph 1 requirements for prohibition are as follows: (1) an agreement between undertakings, (2) affectation of trade between
Member States, and (3) affectation of competition within the
Common Market. The joint venture context apparently raises no
special difficulties regarding the first two requirements. 121 On the
contrary, the decisive question in this context is "whether coopera125.

See De Laval/Stork, 20 O.J. EuR. Comm.(No. L 215) at 16; SiXTH REPORT,

supra note 58, at 39.

126. See Mok, supra note 1, at 138. However, regarding the first criterion, it
should be recognized that anticompetitive effects can evolve out of several different aspects of the joint venture situation. The joint venture itself will normally
be created by agreement. Consequently, where the mere formation of the joint
venture will directly give rise to anticompetitive effects (e.g., formation of a joint
sales subsidiary), it is the agreement to form which is prohibited. Where the
anticompetitive effects are only indirectly related to the formation, as where
group effect restrictions result from operation, it would seem more accurate to say
that the prohibition should relate to concerted practices or agreements occurring
during operation. If the Commission prohibits the actual formation of the joint
venture where group effect is involved, it must consider that even indirect effects
of the agreement to form entitle it to prohibit the formation itself.
Furthermore, at the time of formation or thereafter, the parents can enter
collateral agreements relating to their behavior outside the joint venture which
will have to be judged independently of the agreement to form the joint venture
under article 85, paragraph 1. The same is true, of course, where the parents make
decisions regarding the activity of the joint venture after formation which restrict
competition with outside firms. Here, if the decisions can not be considered
agreements or concerted practices, then perhaps they can be considered decisions
by an association of enterprises.
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tion through the joint venture will have the object or effect of
the parent companies
appreciably restricting competition between
12 7
or between them and other companies.

It should be noted that this statement indicates a refinement on
the "affect competition" requirement which has been added by the
Commission and Court of Justice-the affectation of competition
must be appreciable or noticeable. 2 8 The joint venture context

may call for application of this standard in a different manner than
usual. The presence of "group effect," according to one author,
may warrant an examination for noticeability, not only for the
venture was formed, but also
particular market for which the joint
29
for other markets of the parents.

The Commission made no reference to the "stifling effect" restriction either expressly or implicitly in the Sixth Report, because
there is no basis for applying article 85, paragraph 1 to an agreement which has this effect. The "stifling effect" is the danger that
growth and expansion of the joint venture which threatens a parent's own plans will be prevented by that parent. If joint venture
formation necessarily results in the so-called joint venture concentration, the "stifling effect" should be considered outside the scope
of article 85. As an integral part of the concentration, it is excluded
under the same reasoning as that applied by the Commission to
noncompetition agreements relating to activities which are the
subject of a partial merger. Even if this approach is not acceptable,
3
and Kodak,1 3 1 and
Commission decisions like Christiani/Nielsen1

13 2
Court decisions like Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Export,
all dealing with the so-called "intra-enterprise conspiracy," would

preclude prohibition.

33

127. SmTH REPORT, supra note 58, at 38.
128. See Volk-Vervaecke, supra note 90; Commission Notice, note 89 supra.
The Commission has attempted to provide a rough standard having no legal effect
by which to gauge noticeability, in terms of the market constituted by the products concerned and the annual turnover of the companies involved. Commission
Notice, supra note 89, at 2.
129. Mok, supra note 1, at 138.
130. Christiani/Nielsen, 12 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 165) 12 (1969), 8 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. D36 (1969).
131. Kodak, 13 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 147) 24 (1970), 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
D19 (1970).
132. [1971] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 949, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 81 (1972).'

133. Under either the Christianior the Kodak rationale prohibition would be
precluded. In Christianithe Commission held that a wholly-owned subsidiary

could not be expected to compete with its parent, which has the power to control
the subsidiary's behavior even without an agreement. An agreement dividing a

market between them merely amounts to an allocation of tasks within one eco-
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The Sixth Report statement refers to affectation of competition
"between the parent companies or between them and other companies." Three situations were mentioned earlier in which formation
of a joint subsidiary would have a direct effect on competition3
between outside firms and either the parent or the subsidiary.1 1
The Sixth Report statement indicates that where the affected competition is between the subsidiary and outside firms, it is not subject to the prohibition. Although in that case,'3 ' an effect on competition arguably occurs, it is difficult to term that effect a
"prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition" within the
meaning of article 85, paragraph 1. Whether the other two situations involving effects on competition between the parents and
outside firms are those envisaged by the Commission in the Sixth
Report remains to be seen. Even if they are, the Commission seems
to have placed an odd limitation on the applicability of the prohibition.
Immediately following the statement mentioning the affectation
of competition between the parents and other companies, the
Commission adds: "For the prohibition on restrictive practices to
be applicable in respect of such a formation the parent companies
of the joint venture must at least have been potential competitors.""'3 This statement was obviously not intended to apply to the
above situation, but rather to the situation where an agreement to
form a joint venture affects competition between the parents. It
profides, therefore, a starting point for a discussion of such agreements. For the prohibition to apply where a formation agreement
affects competition between the parents, the parents must have
been actual or potential competitors.
nomic unit. In Kodak (which should actually be viewed under the first require.
ment for prohibition), the Commission held that since subsidiaries can not behave independently in an area governed by their sole parent, coordinated activities of the subsidiaries upon instructions from the parent could not result from
an agreement or concerted practice. In the joint venture context, if a parent has

sufficient control to unilaterally prevent joint venture expansion, the situation is
really no different from that in Kodak. If the parent exercises its veto to prevent
joint venture expansion, there is no agreement involved. If, however, the parent
acts with the actual or tacit agreement of the other parent, the decision for the
joint venture to refrain from expansion could be viewed as the mere allocation of
tasks between entities within one economic unit.
134. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
135. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
136. SmXTH REPORT, supra note 58, at 38.
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1. Direct Effects on Actual Competition
As the Commission stated in the Sixth Report, application of the
Community competition rules does not depend on the legal form
which may have been chosen by the firms concerned, but depends
instead upon the economic realities of the situation. Joint ventures
with the sole purpose of combining certain functions of the firms
involved, as in the case of joint buying organizations, joint selling
agencies and joint research and development companies, have
each been held to be restrictive in nature.'37 If such agreements
appreciably affect competition in the Common Market and trade
between Member States, article 85 will apply whether or not the
joint venture takes the form of a separate legal entity, such as a
subsidiary.
These principles are clearly demonstrated by the Henkell
Colgate"' and United Reprocessors3' decisions. 4 ' Henkel and
Colgate were both large manufacturers of detergents, a market
in which competition over improved methods of production, product quality, and selling efforts was extremely intense, thus enhancing the importance of research. Following individual failures in
this area, the parties decided to create a joint research subsidiary
to which each transferred its individually acquired knowledge,
undertaking to transfer any future acquisitions as well. Although
the parties retained the freedom to conduct research individually,
the Commission found first, that in fact the joint subsidiary would
do all the research because of the high cost involved and because
each pafty had previously failed in its individual research efforts
and second, that the parties had agreed to turn over future discoveries to the subsidiary. Consequently, since it was impossible for
any of the parties to acquire a technical advantage over the other
individually, competition between them in research matters would
be eliminated or largely diminished. The other conditions for prohibition being present, the Commission found article 85, paragraph 1, applicable but granted an exemption under paragraph 3.
The corporate structure of the cooperation played no part in the
Commission's reasoning.''
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Henkel/Colgate, 15 J.O. Comm. EuR. (No. L 14) 14 (1972).
United Reprocessors, 19 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 51) 7 (1976).
A more recent decision also demonstrates these principles. The decision

involved a joint venture for research and development of microscopes, stereomicroscopes, and micro-densitometers and for their distribution. Commission
Decision of Dec. 21, 1977, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 47 (1978).
141. Mok, supra note 1, at 137.

Summer 19781

REGULATION OF JOINT VENTURES

In United Reprocessors, three operators of plants for the reprocessing of nuclear oxide fuels entered an agreement to coordinate
their investment in the reprocessing area. One of the three,
KEWA, was not yet an operator but had undertaken to build a
plant in the next decade, and was consequently treated by the
Commission as an actual competitor. The three also established a
joint subsidiary for marketing the reprocessing services performed
or to be performed by the parties and for allocating reprocessing
work among the parents' plants. The Commission viewed the arrangement as a general cooperation agreement prohibited by paragraph 1 of article 85, but qualifying for an exemption under paragraph 3. In discussing the requirements for prohibition in paragraph 1, the Commission mentioned formation of the subsidiary
only briefly as a means to fix prices for oxide fuels. The subsidiary's role was not even mentioned in the discussion of work allocation. At any rate, formation of the subsidiary to market the product and allocate supply clearly eliminated competition between
the parents over price."' Again, the corporate structure of this
portion of the cooperation was not important to a finding of a
paragraph 1 prohibition.
2.

Direct Effects on Potential Competition

As discussed earlier,' potential competition becomes important
in those situations where the parents are not in actual competition
in the particular product or geographic market for which the joint
venture is formed. The problem again is the probability that one
or more parents would have entered that market but for the joint
venture. Competition is generally affected directly by formation of
the venture only where two or more parents would have entered.
The KEWA decision' involved just such a situation. Four German firms planned to build and operate a plant for reprocessing
nuclear fuels and marketing the products. They set up a jointly
and equally owned subsidiary, KEWA, to which they entrusted the
task either of building or operating such plant or of acquiring
shares in a company for the same purpose. The parties agreed not
to operate in the reprocessing area other than through KEWA.
None of the parents was actually engaged in the reprocessing mar142. The Commission does discuss the subsidiary's role in the determination
of whether the restrictions on competition are indisppisable to the attainment of
exemptible objectives. See United Reprocessors, 19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 51)
at 12.
143. See note 17 & text accompanying notes 15-36 supra.
144. 19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 51) 15 (1975).
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ket, although all four jointly owned a small experimental reprocessing plant at Karlsruhe. KEWA bought shares in United Reprocessors, the joint subsidiary, and as a consequence, KEWA's parents agreed not to build their own proposed joint plant.'
Curiously, in finding that the requirements for prohibition in
article 85, paragraph 1 were met in the KEWA situation, the Commission focused not upon the agreement to form the joint subsidiary, but upon the undertaking by the parties not to operate in the
reprocessing field except through the subsidiary.' 4' In its comments
on the decision in the Sixth Report, the Commission again focused
upon the collateral agreement, rather than upon the agreement to
form the subsidiary, as restricting potential competition between
the parents. "' It is possible that the subsidiary would not have
operated as a reprocessor or seller of reprocessed products until
sometime in the distant future. The parents had agreed as part of
the United Reprocessors deal that KEWA would delay building its
reprocessing plant. The United Reprocessors subsidiary was to act
only as a joint marketing agency for reprocessed fuels, and KEWA
had nothing to supply for sale. In the meantime, KEWA merely
acted as a medium for investment in United Reprocessors. Apparently little or none of the parents' investment was being directed
to the building of a plant with productive capacity. Arguably, each
parent had the ability to invest outside the joint venture in reprocessing capacity. Consequently it could not be said at that time
that formation of KEWA affected potential competition in the
reprocessing area.
The Commission determined that a specific agreement not to
compete in that area, however, was a different matter. Although
the parents were not actual competitors, "the fact that they all
possess reprocessing technology makes them from now on potential
competitors."'4 The specific agreement not to compete was therefore held to be prohibited by article 85, paragraph 1, although it
qualified for an article 85, paragraph 3 exemption. The Commission focused upon one objective factor-possession of reprocessing
technology-to determine that each of the four parents was a potential market entrant at some point in the future. "9
In the next reported Commission decision, Vacuum Inter145.

Id.

146. See COMMISSION OF THE EuRopEw CoMMUNITIES, FIFr REPORT ON COMPETITION PoLcY 43 (1976).

147. SixTH REPORT, supra note 58, at 39.
148. KEWA, 19 O.J. EuR. CoMm. (No. L 51) 15, 18 (1976).
149. See notes 19-20 & accompanying text supra.
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rupters,'50 the Commission apparently prohibited formation of a
joint subsidiary under article 85, paragraph 1 because it eliminated potential competition, even though the agreement qualified
for an article 85, paragraph 3 exemption. As in KEWA, the joint
venture was formed to enter a new product market, and the parents were actual competitors in other areas. The two parents were
located in the United Kingdom, as was the subsidiary, and both
produced a large variety of heavy electrical equipment, including
switchgear apparatus. The joint subsidiary was formed solely to
produce vacuum interrupters, a component of switchgear apparatus, and was vertically related to both parents. Although the parents were still cooperating in certain areas, 5 ' the Commission
found that their potential for competition in other areas had not
been reduced. One of the terms of the formation agreement was
that the parents would not manufacture vacuum interrupters for
sale individually and that neither they nor their other subsidiaries
would purchase vacuum interrupters elsewhere as long as the joint
subsidiary remained willing and able to supply them on competitive terms. The joint subsidiary was the only producer of vacuum
interrupters in the EEC, where there was not yet a real market for
the product. The construction and operation of these products
raised enormously complex problems requiring extremely large
investments.
Even though each parent had felt it would be impossible to enter
the market for vacuum interrupters alone, the Commission found
the parents to be potential competitors on the basis of the following
factors:
their experience in the field of heavy electrical equipment and their
ability to manufacture components therefor, the extent and quality
of their research and development work, some of which was concentrated in the field of vacuum interrupters, their skill in producing
electrical equipment generally and the natural growth of their activities in the field of manufacture of electrical equipment. 5 '
Consequently, formation of the subsidiary eliminated potential
competition because it prevented two firms which otherwise could
have entered independently from doing so. The Commission did
not state, however, that formation restricted competition. It prohibited the venture because it was formed "on such terms that
150. Vacuum Interrupters, 20 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 48) 32 (1977).
151. One parent was a wholly-owned subsidiary of an American firm which
had cooperated in other areas with the other parent. Id.
152. Id. at 36.
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[the parents] deprive themselves of the possibility of developing
and selling that product independently of, and in competition with
each other."' 53 This language may be construed as referring to the
undertaking by the parents not to manufacture or buy vacuum
interrupters except through the joint subsidiary. The agreement
was in essence an undertaking by them not to operate in the vacuum interrupters field except through the subsidiary, similar to
the prohibited undertaking in KEWA.
The Commission may have adopted the view that the agreement
to form the joint venture is insufficient by itself to preclude parental entry independently of the joint venture. An additional binding
undertaking by the parents not to operate except through the subsidiary may be necessary before the prohibition in article 85, paragraph 1 will apply. This supposition is supported by the Commission's treatment of KEWA and Vacuum Interruptersin the Sixth
Report. After explaining the KEWA decision in terms of the separate undertaking by the parents not to operate in the reprocessing
field other than through the joint subsidiary, the Commission
stated in the next paragraph that54 a similar line of reasoning was
applied in Vacuum Interrupters.1
Where the joint venture is created to enter a new geographic
market in which it will manufacture and sell substantially the
same products manufactured and sold in other geographic markets
by the parents, apparently a -different result is required. In such a
153.

Id.

154. SIXTH REPORT, supra note 58, at 40. The Commission's discussion of the
Vacuum Interruptersdecision at pages 89-90 of the Sixth Report seems to contra-

dict this statement.

The Commission discussed the "affect trade between Member States" requirement in this decision at some length, since both parents as well as the joint
subsidiary were located in the United Kingdom and a market did not yet exist in

the EEC for the product in question. The reasoning used by the Commission is
in part similar to the "restriction of economic interpenetration" reasoning used
by the Court of Justice in Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v. Commission, 12

Comm. Mkt. L.R. 7 (1973). Since there are no other manufacturers of vacuum
interrupters in the Common Market, said the Commission, formation of a joint
venture by two potential manufacturers affects the structure of competition in the
Common Market and thus trade between Member States. If the parents had
entered separately, an export trade with other Member States would have developed within the framework of competition between the two parents. Exports from
the U.K. are now likely to start earlier and under a different pattern. Also,
formation of the joint subsidiary, by two producers of electrical equipment which

already supply most of the large customers for these products in the U.K., is likely
to prevent other firms in the other Members States from being able to break into
the U.K. market. Vacuum Interrupters, 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 48) 32.
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situation, American courts equate the effect on potential competition resulting from formation with an elimination of actual competition, as mentioned previously. 5 5 The Commission is apparently
willing to apply the prohibition to the formation agreement itself,
as the comments on such an arrangement in the Sixth Report seem
to indicate. " ' For example, two firms wanted to create a joint
subsidiary to enter the French market in order to improve their
share of that market vis-a-vis more powerful competitors. Although one parent was well-established in the Community on the
particular product market, the other was relatively new. The joint
subsidiary's products, which were to carry a new trademark, would
have been substantially the same as products manufactured and
distributed by the parents in other countries. Appparently, the
parties to the agreement withdrew it after the Commission voiced
its objections. The Sixth Report implies that the Commission
probably would have found that each parent could have entered
the French market separately, but for the joint subsidiary. It is not
entirely clear whether the agreement to form alone would have
been sufficient for application of article 85, because the Commission also mentioned anticompetitive effects evolving out of the
trademark arrangement. The Commission felt that having a trademark for the subsidiary's products which was different from the
parents' trademarks "would impede effective competition between
57
the products of the two firms and of the joint venture."
3.

The Group Effect

The first Commission decision under the EEC Treaty in which
the group effect restriction 58 played a role was Bayer/GistBrocades.519 Two drug manufacturers, Bayer and Gist, needed
larger quantities of raw penicillin and an intermediate product, 6APA, in order to meet increased demand. Each firm was already
producing both products and had to decide whether to increase
plant capacity or to enter long-term supply contracts in order to
acquire the extra quantities needed. To meet their mutual needs,
they agreed that Bayer would expand its 6-APA production and
Gist would expand its production of raw penicillin. Each contributed financially to the other's expansion and each was required to
supply the other to the extent of the latter's investment in the
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See note 32 & accompanying text supra.
SIXTH REPORT, supra note 58, at 91.
Id.
See discussion of "group effect" restriction at section LII.B supra.
Bayer/Gist-Brocades, 19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 30) 13 (1976).
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former's expansion. Originally, the parties had planned to carry
out their expansion programs through jointly and equally owned
subsidiaries, but the Commission objected that the subsidiaries
would provide a vehicle for joint control of production and investment, which was incompatible with article 85. The parties thereafter withdrew the subsidiaries from their plans. Without the subsidiaries, the remainder of the agreement was held to constitute a
specialization agreement with long-term supply contracts, which
was contrary to article 85, paragraph 1, but eligible for an article
85, paragraph 3 exemption.'
The Commission indicated that formation of the subsidiaries
would have precluded the exemption because the resulting restrictions on competition would not have been indispensable to the
specialization agreement. If the Commission's comments on the
subsidiaries had stopped there, one might easily have concluded
that the restriction resulting from formation was the above described group effect restriction. The Commission stated, however,
that under the revised arrangement, each firm would have been
able to expand production of its specialized product as it deemed
necessary. On the other hand, if the new 6-APA and raw penicillin
plants had originally been transferred to joint subsidiaries, it
would have had the effect of bringing the production of raw penicillin and 6-APA and investment under joint control. Since each firm
was to be equally represented, both in the management of the subsidiary and on the coordinating committee, either would have been
able to veto any management decision with which it did not agree.
The result would inevitably have been that output would have been
determined by joint agreement; neither firm would have been able,
without the other's approval, to increase the quantities available to
it for resale to other firms or for processing, and hence to increase,
to the detriment of the other, the quantities supplied to the market
by it.I1t
This language creates difficulties in that it implies that formation
of the subsidiaries would have left neither parent free to act independently of the other in the production and investment of raw
penicillin and 6-APA. This would normally be true only if formation of the subsidiaries had the direct effect of eliminating competition between the parents or the effect of bringing about a concentration between them. The facts set out in the decision, however,
indicate that both parents would have been free to carry on indi160. Id.
161. Id. at 20.
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vidually the same activities as the subsidiaries. Consequently, it
seems unlikely that the Commission was reaching either of these
conclusions. Furthermore, the Commission indicated that competition with respect to production and investment would have been
restricted, which suggests that joint production subsidiaries such
as that in Solmer were envisaged.
Apparently, all of the subsidiaries' output would thus have gone
to the two parents for individual or independent marketing, based
upon the parents' reason for cooperating withone another. The
Commission in Solmer,81 as well as subsequent commentators,
have concluded that joint production subsidiaries could lead to a
restriction of competition over production and investment. Both
the Commission and the commentators, however, discussed the
restriction in terms of the "group effect," which is not normally
associated with a complete elimination of parental freedom of action in the concerned areas.'63 Whether the Commission had actually abandoned the old "part and parcel" argument that "group
effect" is the natural consequence of the joint venture concentration and hence not an independent restriction thus remained a
matter of doubt. The Commission clarified the Bayer/Gistdecision
in its Sixth Report on Competition Policy, however, indicating
that its basis for opposing creation of the joint ventures in that case
was clearly the "group effect," referring in that context to a possible carry-over of collusion into areas other than production and
investment of raw penicillin and 6-APA. Formation of the joint
subsidiaries "would have led not only to joint control over investment and production in relation to the two products but also, in
view of the economic importance of earlier production stages, to
cooperation between the parent companies on the markets for processed penicillin and final products.""'
162.

See note 49 supra.

163. Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1035. The effect is complicated in the case of
raw penicillin because investment costs for expanded production are high. A
decision by one firm not to allow expanded joint subsidiary production of raw
penicillin (the "stifling effect") might prevent the other from undertaking to
expand its own individual capacity because of the high costs involved. However,

neither firm is absolutely precluded from expanding internally and in any case,
individual expansion under the present set up is still affected by the high costs.

164. SIxTH

REPORT,

supra note 58, at 39. One will recall that Pitofsky felt,

where joint production subsidiaries were involved, that additional evidence of

probable collusion was necessary in order to allow the group effect inference to
be drawn. Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1035. Although very little is mentioned about
it, a coordinating committee was to be set up by Bayer and Gist along with the
joint subsidiaries. Bayer/Gist Brocades, 19 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 30) at 16.
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The Sixth Report also includes another previously unreported
case in which the Commission found a violation of article 85, paragraph 1.115 Two firms attempted to increase their production capacity on a rather large scale by forming a joint subsidiary in which
each parent would be equally represented. Each parent would receive half of the subsidiary's output at cost. One was to use its
share of the output primarily for processing into finished goods.
The other was to sell its share, which represented most of its turnover, to outsiders. The two firms had a considerable share of the
market in Western Europe. The Commission found that because
the market for the concerned goods was ologopolistic, "the common determination of the joint venture's business policy would
inevitably lead to coordination of commercial activities between
the parents and, in particular, to the alignment of prices."' 6 This
decision is important because it takes the Solmer and Bayer/Gist
treatments of joint production subsidiaries a step further. According to this decision, price competition, as well as production and
investment decisions, may be affected by formation of a joint production subsidiary, The distinguishing factor appears to be the
joint venture's capacity for production of the concerned goods in
relation to that of the parents. The Commission said that the joint
venture's capacity was to be "the equivalent of a substantial proportion of the capacity already operated by one of [the parents]. ' '"7 In addition, one of-the firms was to sell its share of the

joint venture's product to outsiders, "these sales representing the
bulk of its own turnover.'

' 168

Finally, both parents had a substantial share of the market for
the goods, and the market was oligopolistic. In this situation, it is
likely that the parents would agree on prices for the concerned
products, especially since one parent retained most of its share of
the joint venture's output for processing into finished products. It
obviously had an interest in ensuring that its competitors who
acquired semi-finished products for further processing from the
other parent did so at a noncompetitive price. By contrast, in
Solmer the parents each produced a larger quantity of the conPerhaps the Commission considered that the presence of the coordinating com-

mittee was sufficient additional evidence to conclude that joint control of the
subsidiaries would lead to a restriction of competition between the parents. Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1012.
165. SixTlHRpowr, supra note 58, at 91.

166. Id.
167. Id.

168. Id.
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cerned product than they received for sale from the joint subsidiary. "69
' The High Authority thus concluded that each parent would
pursue an independent pricing policy, despite probable collusion
over production and investment.
A subsequent decision, De LavallStork,70 involved a situation in
which the group effect could necessarily be inferred."' Stork, a
Dutch firm, and De Laval International, an American firm, formed
a joint venture in the Netherlands to research, manufacture, sell
and maintain steam turbines, compressors, and pumps for steam
turbines. The joint venture had no legal personality and, under
Dutch law the parents remained jointly and severally liable for all
obligations of the venture up to the amount of the venture's assets.
Each parent owned equal shares of the venture. Stork's contribution was in cash; De Laval's contribution was in expertise. After a
certain period, Stork transferred its plant to the joint venture and
provided the technical staff required for operating plant facilities.
De Laval was to provide a management staff to handle the daily
affairs of the business, with major management decisions requiring
the consent of both parents. The American parent, International,
was effectively controlled by one of the largest conglomerates in
the United States,7 which had been involved in producing and
selling steam turbines and related products throughout the world.
The United States group had already penetrated the European
Community market via export of the relevant products. The Dutch
parent similarly controlled by a larger Dutch group was already
producing and selling the relevant products on the European market before the joint venture was formed. Both joint venture parents
continued to manufacture their turbine products and to market
them in the Community. The Commission determined that the
aim of the parents in creating the joint venture was "to increase
De Laval International's penetration of the European market and
to expand the business of [the Dutch parent] in the field of compressors and industrial turbines."'7 The Commission determined
further that the parents remained either actual or potential competitors in the European market after formation of the venture.
The American company was at least a potential competitor in the
169.

See text accompanying notes 71 & 72 supra..

170. De Laval/Stork, 20 O.J. EUR. Comm.(No. L 215) 11 (1977).
171.

See Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1034; text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.

172. De Laval was a subsidiary of another United States corporation, De
Laval Turbine, Inc., which was directly controlled by a large United States conglomerate, Transamerica Corp.
173. De Laval/Stork, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 215) at 13.
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European market, because it was engaged in the same market in
the United States, because it already possessed the necessary expertise, and because its financial position enabled it to make any
necessary investments. In fact, the American firm could have been
considered an actual competitor in the European market because
it was already exporting the relevant products for sale in the European Community. Under the joint venture agreement, each parent
retained the right individually to sell the products in the Community and each parent could still use separately the results of
joint research carried out by the venture. The Commission concluded that the object and effect of the formation agreement was
to restrict and distort competition within the Common Market.'
Since the "consent of both parties is required for any major decision concerning the activities of the joint venture,' ' 7 the Commission determined that anticompetitive effects would result from the
"consultations which will inevitably have to take place between
[the parents]." The Commission explained its decision:
Even if an increase in competition between the joint venture and
other companies in business on the relevant market results from the
agreement, the effect of the agreement is to eliminate competition
between the two parties on the same markets, both as regards research and as regards production and marketing. The two companies have therefore deprived themselves of the opportunity for autonomous costing and pricing, which would be available if their
activities were separate. By exchanging information connected with
their competitive ability they not only destroy the independence of
their market conduct but also remove uncertainty as regards their
future behavior towards their competitors.'
This language suggests that the Commission will always draw the
group effect inference where the joint venture actually competes
with the parents on the same market. The Commission infers that
the parents will exchange information which will destroy the independence of their own market conduct when they inevitably consult over activities of the joint venture. In effect, the Commission
conclusively presumes that an agreement to form the joint venture
will "eliminate" competition between the parents in the field of
the joint venture.
The next "group effect" decision, GEC/Weir Sodium
174. The Commission nevertheless granted an article 85, paragraph 3 exemption.
175. Id. at 16.
176. Id.
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Circulators,7 7 involved a joint venture agreement between two
United Kingdom firms to develop, produce, and sell sodium circulators for commercial fast reactors. One parent, Weir, held diverse
interests in the development, manufacture, and sale of pumps,
aircraft equipment, and steel foundry products (including high
precision steel castings). The other parent, GEC, likewise held
pertinent interests in the development, manufacture, and sale of
pumps and aircraft instrumentation, and was a user of foundry
products and high precision steel castings. In addition, GEC was
quite active in other markets. As no separate entity was to be
formed, the joint venture agreement allocated tasks between the
parents. Weir was to provide expertise, work, and components in
the field of pump technology and hydraulics. Similarly, GEC was
to contribute expertise and components in the field of nuclear
reactor technology, instrumentation, and mechanical and electrical engineering.'78 The activities of the joint venture were to take
place at factories and facilities of the parents. Under the agreement the parents were to share knowledge and expertise regarding
sodium circulators, whether acquired while working in the context
of the joint venture or acquired previously. Either parent, however,
was free to act independently if a potential customer refused to
contract with the joint venture or if the other parent refused to
support the joint venture in accepting a contract for sodium circulators.
The Commission held that formation of the venture violated
article 85, paragraph 1, but that the joint venture agreement was
entitled to a paragraph 3 exemption. The agreement was held to
restrict competition between the parents in the field of the joint
venture and in related fields because the parents "are likely to
coordinate their conduct and be influenced in what would otherwise have been their independent decisions and activities."'79 The
Commission found that the group effect was operative at two distinct levels of parental activity: first, in the field of the joint venture, and second, in other fields where the parents are engaged in
"overlapping, related, and competitive activities.""'8 At the first
level, in the field of the joint venture,'"' the Commission ruled that
the parents were actual competitors in the field of sodium circula177.
(1977).
178.
179.
180.
181.

GEC/Weir Sodium Circulators, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (1o. L 327) 26
Id. at 27.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
See text at notes 170-74 supra.
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tors, and held that the effect of forming the joint venture and
conferring equal control on the parents was to destroy the ability
of either parent to "make independent business decisions on any
matter of importance relating to sodium circulators.

182

Even

though the parents had expressly agreed that in certain instances
one or the other could act independently in producing and selling
the involved product,' the Commission felt that the likelihood of
independent action was nonexistent, since "[p]arent parties will
not in general compete with the activities of joint ventures in
which they hold substantial stakes.

....

"I

At the second level, the Commission ruled that where parents
held related interests in areas outside the field of the joint venture,
formation of a venture was "likely to provide opportunities and
inducements

. .

to enlarge their common activities and impair

free competition between [the parents] in those other areas."'8
The Commission found that the parents were not only horizontally
competitive in other markets, but were also vertically related-with one parent being a producer and the other a consumer
of steel foundry products. The Commission felt that in this case
the continued association within the joint venture of senior employees from both parents could "be expected to lead to an impairment of competition between [the parents] also in these other
areas.' ' 8 6 This "spill-over" of cooperation into parental areas of

activity outside the field of the joint, venture has already been
discussed as being important in the context of partial mergers.
Outside the context of partial mergers, however, it would appear
to be of little significance and would never alone lead to a prohibition of the formation agreement. Where no partial merger is involved, it will always be subordinate to the group effect at the first
level discussed above, or to a direct elimination of competition in
the joint venture's field.
De Laval/Stork and GEC/Weir underscore another important
point-whether the joint venture possesses a separate legal identity in the form of a subsidiary or its foreign equivalent is irrelevant
for purposes of the group effect inquiry. These decisions clearly
indicate that, unlike the High Authority in decisions under the
182. Id.
183. The parties were free to act independently when potential customers
refused to contract with the joint venture and when one of the parents declined
to support the venture in accepting a contract for sodium circulators. Id. at 29.
184. Id. at 31.

185. Id. at 32.
186. Id.
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ECSC Treaty, the Commission will treat the group effect as a
restriction independent of the concentration between the joint venture and, the parents. The reason for this divergence from ECSC
practice is probably grounded in the absence in the EEC Treaty
of a provision comparable to article 66 of the ECSC Treaty. In the
absence of such a provision, if the group effect is not caught by
article 85, paragraph 1, it escapes regulation altogether."
4.

Exemption Under Article 85, Paragraph 3

Once a joint venture arrangement is found to have been prohibited by article 85, paragraph 1, the Commission can declare the
prohibition inapplicable under article 85, paragraph 3,' if the four
conditions of that paragraph are met.' 9 Article 85, paragraph 3
basically operates to save those joint Venture arrangements which
are reasonable in the sense that objective benefits outweigh negative effects on competition.'90 To date, the Commission has refused
to grant the exemption in only three joint venture arrangements-BayerGist-Brocadesand the two unreported cases mentioned in the Sixth Report.
According to the Report, decisions thus far indicate at least two
general categories of joint ventures which will not be granted an
exemption-when benefits are insubstantial and competition in
the market will or may be substantially reduced, and when the
joint venture's object could as easily be achieved by less restrictive
means. The first category includes joint ventures "formed by large
firms in different Member States with the object or effect of coordinating their conduct in the market.""'9 An example of a joint venture falling within this category would be the Sixth Report case"'
involving a joint production subsidiary for the manufacture of
187. See text at note 124 supra.
188. The Commission alone has the power to declare paragraph 1 inapplicable. Regulation No. 17, supra note 59, at 207.
189. The four conditions are: (1) contribution to improving the production or
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress; (2) allowing

consumers a fair share of resulting benefits; (3) not imposing restrictions which
are not indispensable to the attainment of the above objectives; and (4) not
affording the concerned firms the possibility of eliminating competition in respect

of a substantial part of the products in question. EEC Treaty, supra note 52, art.
85, para. 3.
190. "[Tlhe main question is whether the joint venture offers substantial
objective benefits to offset the disadvantages for competition." SIXTH REPORT,
supra note 58, at 40.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 92; see text accompanying notes 165-69 supra.
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semi-finished products for use or sale by the parents. No real benefits of a public nature could be said to result from the agreement,
since its purpose was merely to expand the existing capacity of the
parents. On the other hand, it was bound to result in a substantial
restriction of competition in the market for the parent's finished
goods or for the semi-processed goods because the parents had a
substantial share of both markets for Western Europe. In addition,
the structure of these markets was oligopolistic.

19 3

Another exam-

ple in the first category is the Sixth Report case in which potential
competition was eliminated when competing parents created a
joint venture in order to enter a new geographic market.194 The
objective in that case was to develop an inroad in the new geographic area against established competitors. Under those facts,
formation of the subsidiary could hardly be said "to contribute to
the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to
the promotion of technical or economic progress." 195At any rate,
potential competition would almost certainly have been eliminated by formation, since each parent had the capacity to enter
the new geographic area on its own. Apparently, the market was
oligopolistic and the firms held large shares of the market.'96 The
negative effect on competition clearly outweighed the minimal
positive benefits.
97 joint subsidiaries fall within the secThe Bayer/Gist-Brocades'
ond category. The Commission felt in that case that the parental
objective-increasing available quantities of raw and semiprocessed penicillin for use in medicinal preparations-could be
achieved through less restrictive means than joint subsidiaries.
Formation of the subsidiaries would have led to a coordination of
production and investment for the penicillin, and collusion would
have carried over into other parental activities. Furthermore, formation of the jointly-owned subsidiaries might have eliminated
parental ability to produce penicillin independently of the joint
venture. On the other hand, cooperation in the form finally agreed
upon would achieve the parental objective without the above anticompetitive effects. Consequently, the restrictions resulting from
formation of the subsidiaries were not indispensable to the attainment of permissible objectives, and an exemption would not have
193. SIXTH REPORT, supra note 58, at 92.
194. Id.; see text accompanying notes 155-56 supra.
195. EEC Treaty, supra note 52, art. 85, para. 3.
196. SIXTH REPORT, supra note 58, at 40.
197. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 30) 13 (1976); see text accompanying notes
159-61 supra.
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been available if the subsidiaries had been formed.
In cases falling within the second category, the test is not one of
balancing benefits against harms. Rather, the factual situations
suggest that permissible, positive, and beneficial objectives might
have been reached by less restrictive means. Where such objectives
exist, the Commission will be reluctant to deny the paragraph 3
exemption. Before refusing a paragraph 3 exemption, the Commis-

sion will "consider whether the imposition of obligations and conditions can reduce the restriction of competition to the minimum
indispensable to attain the objective of the agreement." '
V.

CONCLUSION

The authors of the EEC Treaty believed that a system of undistorted competition was essential to the establishment of a true
Common Market, and article 85 was included in the Treaty to
ensure that political borders would not be reinstated as a result of
private business agreements. Joint ventures can be as effective as
other mechanisms of cooperation in affecting interstate trade or
partitioning national markets. Though the obvious inclination has
been to treat joint ventures as mergers (as, for example, the approach utilized by the High Authority under the ECSC Treaty and
by the United States Supreme Court in the Penn-Olin case'99 ), in
the absence of a merger provision in the EEC Treaty, the Commission has had little choice but to treat joint venture formations as
agreements in restraint of trade, subject to article 85.
The Commission's apparent reluctance to take this step and its
eventual willingness to do so is especially interesting in light of its
continuing policy that article 85 does not apply to mergers. When
the Commission first enunciated its merger policy it made clear
that joint ventures might represent one form of merger requiring a
different approach. Indeed, joint venture formations are now
clearly subject to the article 85, paragraph 1 prohibition, except in
those rare situations in which formation results in an integration
between the parents. In other cases where formation gives rise
directly to anticompetitive effects, or indirectly via the "group
effect," article 85, paragraph 1 will act to prohibit the formation
unless one of the requirements for prohibition therein is not met.
The most basic prerequisite for paragraph 1 prohibition in the joint
venture context is that the parents must have been actual or potential competitors. Since this will normally be the case, most joint
198.

SIXTH REPORT, supra note 58, at 40.

199. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
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ventures which affect trade between Member States will be prohibited. Nevertheless, if the benefits of the formation outweigh the
effects on competition, the joint venture may escape prohibition
via an article 85, paragraph 3 exemption. All but three joint ventures considered by the Commission thus far have escaped by this
route.
Partial mergers will be treated as a rarity, as will joint venture
formations resulting in total parental integration. To effect an excluded partial merger, the parents must satisfactorily demonstrate
to the Commission not only that they have completely and irreversibly abandoned their independent role in the business activity
turned over to the joint venture, but also that the partial integration will not weaken parental competition in areas where the parent firms remain formally independent. Finally, agreements collateral to a partial merger which restrict parental freedom of action
in areas not related to the joint venture's activities will normally
fall within the provisions of article 85, paragraph 1. On the other
hand, collateral agreements which pertain to parental activity in
the joint venture's line of trade will escape article 85 prohibition.
Although the Commission has been slow to formulate the issues
and clarify certain aspects of its position in the joint venture area,
a definite policy is taking shape. The Commission's task is now one
of expounding its position more fully and of persuading the European Court of Justice that its policy is-the correct one. The Court
of Justice has not yet dealt with the joint venture problem, because
none of the Commission's decisions in this area has been challenged. It is still possible, though unlikely, that the Court would
take an approach different from that of the Commission. For the
present, however, except in rare instances, joint venture formations will clearly be treated as restrictive agreements subject to
article 85.

